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5.1  Introduction 
The legislative histories  of  major laws affecting  the civil  service  system 
show that an active role in shaping them was played by early federal employee 
unions.  The evidence  offered  in this  chapter reveals  that  federal employee 
groups were able to utilize these earlier institutional changes to expand their 
influence and direct the subsequent course of the civil service system. Indeed, 
as an interest group, federal workers have done rather well. Even though fed- 
eral workers do not have the right to strike, most of the evidence indicates that 
the ‘compensation of federal employees generally exceeds the amount that they 
would earn either in the private sector or elsewhere in the public sector. 
Federal unions have achieved this favorable outcome, at least in part, be- 
cause they have been granted direct input into the design of the very institutions 
that determine their members’ compensation. By law, federal wages must be 
comparable with those in the private sector. Yet federal employee unions have 
been able to influence the design of the surveys used to judge whether govern- 
ment salaries are equal to those in the private sector in ways that are favorable 
to federal workers. The influence that federal unions have had on salary legisla- 
tion is also evident in the structure of salaries within the civil service. In lob- 
bying for statutory wage increases, there has been considerable emphasis by 
the unions on an egalitarian pay schedule and on rewarding seniority within 
the bureaucracy. Through their efforts, federal unions have been able to secure 
a relatively high average wage, but there is considerable wage compression at 
upper-level positions. In addition, federal employees have extensive employ- 
ment protection, and seniority, rather than merit, largely determines both indi- 
vidual salaries and employment security. 
There are a number of reasons for the apparent  emphasis by federal em- 
ployee unions on an egalitarian pay schedule and seniority. In general, these 
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have been goals of all labor unions (see Freeman and Medoff  1984). Trade 
unions  have  long  pursued  a policy  of  a  “standard  rate”  of  pay,  partly  be- 
cause unions  are political  entities and  must  therefore remain  responsive  to 
the demands of the majority  of their members. Indeed, a major determinant 
of the demand for union membership has been a desire to reduce perceived 
inequalities in compensation  (see Farber and Saks 1980). Equalizing wages 
among  workers  contributes  to  solidarity  in  union  establishments,  without 
which “it is difficult to see how a union would be able to maintain its organiza- 
tional strength” (Freeman and Medoff  1984, 80). Consistent with the notion 
that group solidarity is important for lowering the costs of collective action is 
union insistence on a wage rate, or range of rates, that is associated with partic- 
ular jobs rather than with individuals. By deemphasizing the merits of individ- 
uals, unions seek to achieve a more cohesive organization. 
Unions  appear to have been  successful in implementing egalitarian wage 
plans. A narrower range of wage dispersion is seen in the unionized, relative to 
the nonunionized, sectors of the US.  economy (see Freeman  1980). Because 
unionized establishments have been induced to place less weight on the merits 
of individual workers, more weight is placed on other factors, such as seniority, 
for deciding promotion or  job retention. While job protection based on senior- 
ity is also evident in nonunion establishments, the degree of seniority protec- 
tion tends to be much greater for unionized ones (Freeman and Medoff  1984, 
More specifically for federal unions, the emphasis on egalitarian pay sched- 
ules helps promote solidarity among rank-and-file workers, who are members 
of different unions. Membership  is spread across a number of  unions,  such 
as the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), the National 
Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), the National Federation of Post Of- 
fice Clerks,  and the National  Letter  Carriers  Association,  and membership 
comes from clerical and lower-level management employees.’ Individuals oc- 
cupying more senior professional positions tend to belong to professional  or- 
ganizations, such as the American Bar Association, the American Federation 
of Technical Engineers, the American Optometric  Association, and the Na- 
tional Society of Professional Engineers. In lobbying for salary legislation, and 
in commenting on the proposals of the president’s pay agent, federal unions 
naturally have been more concerned about raising the salaries of their members 
than about raising the salaries of those employees in higher positions who are 
more likely to be members of professional groups.* Egalitarian objectives have 
helped  solidify the different unions, at times to the disadvantage of higher- 
level federal employees. 
The purpose of  this chapter is to describe the structure of the federal pay 
system and to show how federal unions have influenced its design. Of course, 
unions have not received all that they have wanted. Nevertheless, their record, 
beginning with such early benefits legislation as the eight-hour day as well as 
with the classification and salary legislation examined in this chapter, indicates 
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remarkable lobbying success. These findings bear directly on current debates 
over the direction of causality between rules (legislation and executive orders) 
and the growth of union influence. At issue is whether recent policy changes 
spurred the growth of federal unions, giving them greater bargaining power, or 
whether union political influence initiated the policy changes that brought fur- 
ther  union  growth  and  performance.'  Federal  unions  and  other  employee 
groups grew out of the establishment of the merit system, which lowered the 
costs and raised the returns to membership. Federal unions then became active 
in  securing favorable  public policies regarding  salaries, workplace  benefits, 
and recognition. 
We return to this issue in the conclusion to the chapter. In the chapter sum- 
mary, we also consider some alternative explanations for the federal pay struc- 
ture. We argue that, although the existing distribution of federal pay is incon- 
sistent both with current notions of  incentive wage structures and with merit 
principles, it is consistent with the common objectives of most labor unions. 
5.2  Federal Pay Structures and Union Influence 
5.2.1  Pay Structures 
Federal civilian employees are currently covered by a number of  different 
pay plans. The majority of these employees (see table 5.1) are under the Gen- 
eral Schedule (GS) pay plan, which consists of eighteen grades4  This system 
is intended primarily  for white-collar employees, and, in  1989, the General 
Schedule included approximately 53 percent of the federal civilian labor force. 
At least in principle, the grades are designed to reflect increasing degrees of 
difficulty and responsibility. Within grades GS- 1-GS- 15, there are ten sched- 
uled steps for advancement within each grade. The General Schedule is a na- 
tional pay system, and, until recently, it made no allowance for regional differ- 
ences in the cost of  living or local wage standards5 In addition, there is the 
Senior Executive Service, created by the  1978 Civil Service Reform Act (92 
Stat. 11  1  l), which covers a limited number of top officials who were previously 
Table 5.1  Civilian Employees in the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government by Pay Group, 1949-89  (full-time employees) 
Year  General Schedule  Federal Wage System  Postal  Other System 
1949  829,683  501,533  361,389  11,684 
1969  1,213,695  592,218  654,411  119,145 
1989  1,493,696  314,443  826,126  147,969 
Sources and notes: U.S. Office of Personnel Management (1989). For 1949, employees classified 
under the Classification Act of  1923 are listed as General Schedule. The number of US. Postal 
Service employees in 1989 is from U.S. Post Office Department, Annual Report ofrhe Postmasrev 
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in grades GS-16-GS-18  as well as other top managerial and policy positions 
that do not require Senate confirmation. Special pay plans also exist for mem- 
bers of the Foreign Service and certain occupations, such as physicians. The 
Federal Wage System (FWS) covers blue-collar employees-essentially  trade, 
craft, and other labor occupations.  Under the FWS, blue-collar workers  are 
paid according to the prevailing  rate for certain occupations in a designated 
geographic area. The other major pay system is that of postal workers. On  1 
July  197  1, the old post office ceased operating as a department of the federal 
government and began operating as the U.S. Postal Service, a public corpora- 
tion.6 In contrast to most GS and FWS employees, the wages and benefits of 
postal service workers are now set by collective bargaining. 
The Classification Act of 4  March 1923 (42  Stat. 1488)  established the basis 
for the current white-collar pay system of uniform position classification, pro- 
motions, and salaries.’ Prior to the enactment  of  the  1923 law,  departments 
were given lump-sum appropriations, and there were no rules that explicitly 
called for equal pay  for equal work. Some salary rates were  set by  statute, 
and others were not. Hence, department heads had considerable authority in 
determining an employee’s wage, and federal unions lobbied for legislation to 
reduce this discretion. The relative salary position  of  federal employees had 
been declining in the early twentieth century, and private-sector wage increases 
during World War I added to the sense within federal unions that they were 
losing ground. Lobbying efforts were mounted to raise the federal salary level 
and to change the federal salary structure. At the behest of the National Federa- 
tion of Federal Employees (NFFE), one of the largest federal unions at that 
time, a commission was appointed to consider the establishment of a standard- 
ized pay plad that would set salary on the basis of the characteristics of the 
position, not of the individual holding the job (Nesbitt  1976,  62-66). There 
was considerable resistance to such a plan by members of Congress and bureau 
heads, who argued that determining pay was a prime management function, 
not the duty of a commission (U.S. House of Representatives 1920,  54). 
Not only did the NFFE have to confront continuing opposition to pay in- 
creases and job standardization from such notables as Senator Reed Smoot, 
chair of the Appropriations Committee, and the Bureau of Efficiency, but the 
organization  also ran  into problems  with federal workers  who were skilled 
craftsmen. Congress had recognized  the prevailing-rate principle for skilled 
workers in 1861,  and this group of workers had little need for consistent posi- 
tion  classification  and  salaries, especially  since  it  might  undermine  wages 
earned in particular areas (Nesbitt 1976,  399).  Although the NFFE and other 
federal unions finally prevailed in their efforts to obtain passage of the Classi- 
fication Act of  1923,  authorizing comparable pay for comparable work at the 
federal offices covered by the law, skilled employees were exempted from its 
provisions. These exemptions  were maintained  in  the  Classification  Act  of 
1949 (63  Stat. 954),  which formally extended the provisions of the 1923 law 
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the General Schedule with its national pay plan and the Federal Wage System 
with its prevailing-wage practices. 
The Classification Act of  1923 applied immediately to only about 50,000 
employees in the District of  Columbia and was only slowly implemented for 
field service employees. One of the major decisions that had to be made in 
expanding the classification and pay system beyond the Washington, D.C., area 
was whether to allow geographic wage differentials (Feldman 193  1,41). With 
different position definitions and salaries between offices in Washington, D.C., 
and jobs in the field, the system became increasingly difficult to manage after 
1923. Congress, however, was not willing to give up the micro management of 
federal wages until  1949. The dramatic expansion in federal employment be- 
tween  1933 and  1940-the  number  of  federal employees grew by  73 per- 
cent-and  the creation of New Deal agencies in the 1930s raised the costs to 
Congress of managing federal salaries and provided the catalyst for the exten- 
sion of position classification to the rest of the field services (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1975, 1102). The Ramspeck Act of  1940, which extended the 
merit  service to  New  Deal agencies,  followed  by  the Hoover Commission 
report on personnel management practices, ultimately led to the passage of the 
Classification Act of  1949.8 The law authorized the president to expand the 
functions of the Civil Service Commission and to develop a comprehensive 
national pay plan for GS workers. 
Federal employee unions,  such as the NFFE and the AFGE, were active 
supporters of the Classification Act of  1949, and they testified in favor of the 
bill during congressional hearings (U.S. Senate 1949). By extending the pro- 
visions of the Classification Act of 1923 to all merit employees, the 1949 law 
provided for uniform job classifications and salaries nationwide. As federal 
unions achieved their objective of “equal pay for equal work,” supervisor dis- 
cretion in individual salaries and promotions was red~ced.~  As we discuss later, 
Congress also supported the maintenance  of uniform position  classification 
and salary structures within the General Schedule because it offered a means 
to better monitor the personnel system. 
5.2.2  Union Membership 
The influence of federal unions in obtaining favorable public policies is il- 
lustrated by  President  Kennedy’s 1962 Executive Order  10988. During the 
close 1960 presidential campaign, postal and other federal unions obtained a 
pledge  from  John  Kennedy  that,  if  elected,  he  would  back  collective- 
bargaining arrangements between federal workers and their agencies and de- 
partments (Nesbitt 1976, 19; Stern 1988,55,56).  The support of federal work- 
ers and organized labor in general was essential for Kennedy’s election. After 
Kennedy took office, organized labor continued the pressure. In September 
1961, Andrew Biemiller, director of legislation for the AFL-CIO, urged the 
president to issue an executive order recognizing the right of federal employees 
to join labor unions and to engage in  collective bargaining  (see New  York 101  The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Times, 14 September 1961, 14). In response to his earlier commitment, Presi- 
dent  Kennedy  established  a  cabinet-level  task  force  to  explore  federal 
employee-management relations, and, after receiving its recommendations, he 
announced in December  1961 that he would issue an executive order to give 
unions an enhanced  status to help  shape federal personnel  policy  (see New 
York Times, 5 December 1961, 27). 
Executive  Order  10988, issued  in  January  1962,  established  a  labor- 
management program for federal executive branch employees. The order con- 
tained provisions for the formal recognition of  unions, an official status pre- 
viously  denied in the federal service. Although the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 
19 12 allowed federal employees to join unions without penalty of dismissal, it 
did not formally recognize labor units as bargaining units. With the 1962 exec- 
utive order, federal unions were placed in a better position  to represent their 
members'  grievances  over  such  issues  as transfers,  promotions,  discharge, 
safety, and health. The order provided  for a limited range of collective bar- 
gaining through the establishment of exclusive bargaining units to negotiate 
with agency and department heads, but it did not allow collective bargaining 
over wages."' Collective bargaining remained largely restricted to semiautono- 
mous agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. Moreover, the executive 
order reaffirmed  the long-standing opposition by  the federal government to 
strikes by federal workers."  Despite these provisions against collective bar- 
gaining over wages and the prohibition of strikes, Executive Order 10988 ap- 
pears to have provided enough new benefits from union membership to con- 
tribute to the growth of federal unions after 1962 (table 5.2). 
Table  5.2  describes  union  membership  and  employees  in  exclusive  bar- 
gaining units 'for the executive branch and Post Office Department from 1958 
through  1985 and shows the increase in membership following Executive Or- 
der 10988. Federal unions include formal organizations, such as the American 
Federation of Government Employees and, for the postal service, the American 
Postal  Workers  Union.  There is  a  distinction  between  union  membership 
and union representation in federal units. In some cases, nonmembers are in- 
cluded in union bargaining, with the result that the number of employees repre- 
sented by the union exceeds union membership. In addition to formal unions, 
there  can be  other bargaining  organizations  that  engage in  collective bar- 
gaining. The table indicates that many  executive branch  employees  in bar- 
gaining units are not union members. The percentage of union membership in 
the executive branch has declined since the peak in 1972, but membership in 
a bargaining unit has remained relatively stable. By law, collective bargaining 
cannot address salary or benefits issues, which are set by statute and executive 
order; hence, unions and other bargaining organizations must lobby Congress 
and the president for favorable actions regarding pay. Alternatively, member- 
ship in postal unions has remained more stable and includes a larger proportion 
of postal employment. Most bargaining units appear to be postal unions.I* 
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Table 5.2  Federal Employees’ Membership in Unions and Bargaining Units 
Executive Branch  Post Office 
Total  Union  Bargaining  Total  Union  Bargain 
Employment  Membership  Units  Employment  Membership  Units 










































































































Source; Burton and Thomason (1988,29) 
Nore: N.A. = not available. 
collar (FWS) workers than for white-collar (GS) employees. This, in part, may 
be attributed to the manner in which wages have been determined in the federal 
sector. The principle of a prevailing  rate of  pay has long been the basis for 
determining wages for FWS employees, and local wage boards have existed to 
determine  going rates in particular  10calities.l~  Although prior to Executive 
Order 10988 in 1962 there were no formal provisions for labor representation 
on local wage boards, federal unions representing FWS employees had been 
influential in board decisions. Further,  since 1962, unions have been able to 
achieve even greater participation in the rate-fixing process because they are 
granted direct input into the design of wage-survey procedures. Formal repre- 
sentation allowed them to express their views with more force. As a conse- 
quence, in the 1960s, the Civil Service Commission was directed to develop a 
new federal wage  system. The result was a major victory  for those federal 
unions representing blue-collar  employees.  The new  system not only main- 
tained the basic concept of an “area prevailing wage” but also included auto- 
matic in-grade pay increases, based on longevity, that allowed federal wages 
to exceed private ones.I4 Despite claims that wage determination was strictly a 
management decision, through their unions FWS workers appear to have ob- 
tained considerable  say in the outcome. Additionally, because  decisions are 
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to contribute to union activities than have GS workers, whose wages are deter- 
mined by a national pay plan. 
Another problem  for widespread  GS employee union  membership is the 
large number of white-collar workers in the federal government. In  1983, for 
example, 444 different occupation  codes were used to classify white-collar 
workers (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Work Force 
Statistics: Monthly Release  [July 19841). Many of those employees belonged 
to professional  groups, such as the Society of Professional Engineers, which 
have historically opposed union membership. As Murray Nesbitt notes, “Thus, 
the unions which  seek inclusive membership  outside the Postal  Service are 
faced with a dual problem of the skilled craft workers on the one hand and the 
professional, management,  and  supervisory employees on the  other” ( 1976, 
80). This  dichotomy  has resulted  in  the  larger federal  unions  representing 
mainly  the  crafts,  skilled  and  unskilled  labor,  postal  workers,  and  clerical 
workers, while many professionals have abstained from union membership. Is 
Even so, federal unions and employee groups have achieved uncommon suc- 
cess in obtaining supportive legislation from Congress and executive orders 
from the president for GS employees. Before examining the actions of federal 
unions regarding pay,  it is important briefly to address how  well-organized 
postal unions have assisted other federal unions and employee groups in ob- 
taining favorable salary legislation. As described in chapter 4,  not only were 
postal unions, such as the National Association of Letter Carriers and the Na- 
tional Association of Post Office Clerks, the first federal labor organizations 
to form, but they were successful in obtaining early benefits, such as the eight- 
hour day. They also achieved  relatively  higher salaries before workers  else- 
where in the fkderal government. As a result, postal unions became trendsetters 
that helped establish salary and benefit precedents for their colleagues in other 
parts of the federal government. 
James Stern (1988, 55) notes that postal unions have long been among the 
most experienced and effective congressional lobbyists. As early as President 
Roosevelt’s  1906 gag  order,  postal  unions  played  a  central  role  in  labor- 
management negotiations in the federal government. Their lobbying of Con- 
gress to counter the gag order helped bring about the passage of  the Lloyd- 
LaFollette Act (37 Stat. 539), protecting the rights of federal workers to orga- 
nize to promote their own interests. Additionally, Richard Fenno describes the 
actions of postal employee unions in pressuring Congress for salary increases 
and how those efforts benefited other federal workers: “It is acknowledged by 
all participants that the postal workers ‘carry the ball’ and that all other federal 
employees ‘ride on their backs’ in getting pay raises” (1973, 247).16 Because of 
the emphasis on equality of pay in the federal government, once postal workers 
obtained higher salaries, fairness issues were raised by other federal unions in 
calling on Congress to enact  salary adjustment legislation. For example, in 
congressional hearings on federal salary legislation in 1970, representatives of 104  Chapter5 
the AFGE claimed that reforms were needed to give “classified and other statu- 
tory  pay  systems employees  equal treatment  with postal employees”  (US. 
House of Representatives 1970,9  1-92). 
The role of  federal unions and employee groups in influencing pay levels 
and the process by which they are determined is illustrated by the legislative 
histories of the Federal Salary Reform Act of  1962 (76 Stat. 841), the 1970 
Federal Pay Comparability Act (84 Stat.  1946), and the Federal Employees 
Pay Comparability Act of  1990 (104 Stat. 1427). These are the key statutes 
that require that the wages of GS employees be comparable with those paid in 
the private sector. The laws outline how the private-sector comparisons are to 
be made, how they are to be translated into recommendations by the president 
to the Congress for statutory pay increases, and how federal unions and em- 
ployee groups are to be involved in the process.”  Not  surprisingly, federal 
unions and employee groups have been active in lobbying for legislation that 
provides for significant union input into the survey and wage-increase process. 
The 1962 Federal Salary Reform Act instituted annual private-sector  sur- 
veys by  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) for pay comparability. These 
surveys, known  as the  professional,  administrative,  technical,  and  clerical 
(PATC) surveys, became the basis for annual pay adjustments. Survey design 
included such matters as what industries to include, the minimum size of estab- 
lishments in the survey, and what occupations to survey. In principle, the sur- 
veys were to provide information on private-sector earnings by occupation to 
the president’s pay agent. The president could either accept the recommenda- 
tions of the pay agent or propose a lower alternative to Congress by citing a 
national emergency or an economic condition affecting the general welfare. 
Altliough federal unions and employee groups, including the AFGE, the Amer- 
ican Federation of Technical Engineers, and the National Association of Letter 
Carriers, testified in favor of the law, they soon became dissatisfied with the 
way in which it was implemented (U.S. Senate 1962). In testimony before Con- 
gress in  1970, representatives  of  the AFGE claimed that the president had 
failed to carry out the provisions of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 and 
that comparability with the private sector had not been reached (U.S. House of 
Representatives  1970, 82-92).  Accordingly, the AFGE and other unions lob- 
bied for new legislation. 
In 1970, two bills were under consideration for amending the 1962 Federal 
Salary Reform Act, H.R. 18403 and H.R. 18603. H.R. 18403 was introduced 
by Representative Morris Udall, who said that the AFGE has “been after me 
for many months to take actions on some kind of pay-setting reform legislation 
this year” (US.  House of  Representatives  1970, 81). The bill gave federal 
unions a more direct role in the salary comparability process by authorizing an 
Advisory Commission on Federal Pay of five members, of which one member 
was to come from the employee organization with the largest number of mem- 
bers in the General Schedule (in this case, the AFGE) and one from another 
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members from among employees within the government. The advisory com- 
mission was to analyze the annual pay comparability survey conducted by the 
BLS and to recommend pay rates to the president. As such, it essentially took 
over the role of the president’s pay agent (U.S. House of Representatives  1970, 
6-8,47-80).  The president was to transmit the commission’s report to Congress 
along with his recommendations for pay increases. The report was to be con- 
sidered by the Congress in determining whether to accept or reject the presi- 
dent’s recommendation. 
H.R. 18603 was the administration bill, and it competed with the legislation 
favored by  federal employee unions. The bill authorized a smaller committee 
with a less direct and more purely advisory role in the process of determining 
pay comparability. The bill called on the pay agent to consult with an Advisory 
Committee on Federal Salaries of three federal employees appointed by the 
president. There was no specific requirement that federal unions or employee 
groups be represented. The pay agent would then prepare a report comparing 
the rates of pay fixed by the agent, using surveys by the BLS, and those recom- 
mended by the advisory committee. The president would note any differences 
in submitting pay recommendations to the Congress (U.S. House of Represen- 
tatives  1970, 40-45). 
During congressional hearings in July  1970 on the competing bills, there 
were written statements and testimony from forty-two people, of whom thirty- 
seven were from federal unions or organizations of federal employees. Repre- 
sentatives of  the AFGE asserted that the administration bill left management 
too much power over pay issues and made no specific provision for employee 
representatioq on the advisory committee. Representatives of the NFFE and 
the National Association of  Government Employees (NAGE) also called for 
more direct involvement in the pay process (U.S. House of  Representatives 
1970, 11  1-23).  Only smaller unions and associations, such as the National As- 
sociation of Internal Revenue Employees, favored the administration bill-in 
order  to  avoid  domination  by  the  AFGE  (U.S.  House  of  Representatives 
1970, 163). 
Although the unions did not get H.R. 18403 passed, they did get modifica- 
tions in the administration bill to increase their involvement in the salary deter- 
mination process. The 1970  Federal Pay Comparability Act kept the pay agent 
but directed the agent to make recommendations  based on input on survey 
design and interpretation of  the results from two other bodies: an Advisory 
Committee on Federal Pay of three members appointed by the president and a 
Federal Employees Pay Council of five members, not employees of the govern- 
ment, but representatives of employee organizations from the three federal pay 
systems.’’ Up to three members could come from one organization, such as 
the AFGE. This committee was similar to that described in the Udall bill, and 
it was to consider the adequacy of the BLS survey, the process of pay compara- 
bility, and the proposed salary adjustments and give comments to the president. 
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the president’s proposal. As such, the unions and employee groups achieved a 
committee with more independence and a greater role in the salary compara- 
bility process than was proscribed in the original administration bill. 
Despite the changes authorized in the 1970 bill, dissatisfaction among fed- 
eral unions and employee groups with the pay comparability process contin- 
ued. Since its inception, the Federal Employees Pay Council was at odds with 
the recommendations of the pay agent and, in particular, with the final actions 
taken by the president. The view held by most members of the council was that 
the federal government  had not honored its commitment  to pay comparable 
wages. During 1986 congressional hearings to review the Federal Pay Compa- 
rability Act of  1970, there were complaints by  both  the advisory committee 
members and by members of the Federal Employees Pay Council that the pres- 
ident had not gone along with their recommendations  (U.S. House of  Repre- 
sentatives 1986, 3, 7, 13). It was noted that for eight years the president had 
proposed alternative pay rates to those recommended by the various advisory 
committees. Representatives of  the AFGE and the NFFE, who were former 
members of the Federal Employees Pay Council, complained that the problem 
was in giving the president too much latitude in setting pay  (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1986, 39-56).  The Federal Employees Pay Council disbanded 
in protest in 1975.19 
The continuing conflict over salary issues and efforts by federal unions to 
obtain greater influence over them brought a new round of legislation in 1990 
with the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act. In congressional hearings 
on the legislation, the president of the AFGE supported a particular version of 
the bill that would allow for annual salary adjustments based on an employ- 
me‘nt cost index (ECI) and that importantly replaced the president’s pay agent 
with a thirteen-member body, the Federal Salary Council. The proposed Fed- 
eral Salary Council was to be made up as follows: six seats to be held by labor 
representatives; three seats to be held by officials from the Office of Personnel 
Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of 
Labor, respectively; and four seats to be named by the presidentz0  Not only 
were labor groups to receive a prominent position on the new pay council, but 
it was to have a more definitive role in implementing a new pay system. The 
president’s discretion to defer recommended  salary adjustments was to be re- 
stricted (U.S. House of  Representatives 1990, 187). 
The actual language of the 1990 Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act 
again did not  give  the  employee groups all that they  wanted,  but  they did 
achieve annual pay adjustments based on changes in the ECI, due in part to 
local conditions, and a majority of the membership on a new Federal Salary 
Council. The council was to have nine members-three  impartial, six from 
employee organizations  (with up to three from any one union  or employee 
group). Unlike the 1970 law, the new legislation authorized only one advisory 
committee with a clearer mandate. The president’s pay agent was retained but 107  The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
was to provide information to the council and to solicit its views and include 
them in the report to the president. 
The record clearly documents the active role that federal unions played in 
shaping the federal compensation  system. The unions  have not been able to 
obtain a closed-shop designation, the explicit right to bargain over wages, or 
the right to strike, but they have been able to influence the legislation through 
which salary comparability is implemented. Although wage studies by econo- 
mists examined in the next section, as well as time-series data, indicate a sub- 
stantial wage advantage for most federal employees, relative to similar private- 
sector workers, the PATC surveys (designed with considerable union input), by 
contrast,  suggest relatively  lower wages for federal workers.  Indeed, if one 
accepts the PATC survey results, federal salaries have fallen substantially be- 
hind those in the private sector, with the gap between the pay agent’s recom- 
mendations and actual salary increases widening over time.21  In 1979, for ex- 
ample, the president’s pay agent reported, “After comparing Federal and private 
enterprise pay rates and considering the recommendations of employee organi- 
zations and unions, we have determined that the adjustment required would be 
a graduated  increase ranging from a low of  8.80 percent  at GS-6 to  15.43 
percent at GS-I 5,  and an indicated 23.64 percent at GS-18. The overall average 
percentage increase would be 10.41 percent” (President’s Pay Agent  1980, 3). 
The actual increase that became effective on  1 October  1979 was an across- 
the-board salary adjustment equal to 7.0 percent. 
There are reasons for questioning whether the PATC surveys really look at 
“comparable” situations in assessing private-sector  wages. The surveys have 
been criticized for their geographic bias, emphasis on large private employers, 
and failure to ‘include state and local employees when determining comparable 
wages.22  Because smaller private establishments tend to pay lower salaries and 
are more likely to be located outside high-salary metropolitan areas, federal 
employee unions have been steadfastly against the inclusion of small establish- 
ments in the PATC  surveys.23  As we show in the next section, most federal 
workers tend to be paid more than state and local employees, a fact that ex- 
plains why federal unions oppose having those workers included in the wage 
comparability surveys. Although with the passage of the Federal Employees 
Pay Comparability Act of 1990 Congress sought to correct some of these prob- 
lems, the PATC surveys remain the primary basis for determining wage compa- 
rability with the private sector. 
The decision in enacting the  1990 salary law to continue using the PATC 
surveys is, in itself, a reflection of the power of federal unions. In contrast to 
the survey results, standard human capital earnings regressions paint a very 
different picture, one that indicates that federal workers  (except those in the 
most senior positions) are paid more than their private-sector counterparts. Yet 
this standard approach is not the official method for inferring the existence of 
a wage differential. Moreover, both the PATC surveys and human capital earn- 108  Chapter5 
ings regressions indicate considerable wage compression in the federal sector. 
Federal  unions, like unions in the private  sector, widely  support egalitarian 
wage 
5.3  The Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
5.3.1  Relative Federal Salaries 
In chapter 4, we argued that, with the gradual demise of patronage, congres- 
sional interest in maintaining comparatively high federal employee salaries in 
order to extract political assessments would diminish and, hence, that salaries 
would fall. The available evidence supports this prediction, with relative sala- 
ries declining from the  1880s through approximately  1920. After that time, 
however, following intense lobbying by unions, federal salaries began to rise 
relative to the private sector. National income and product account (NIPA) data 
(computer files, update 1991) reveal that the ratio of annual average salaries of 
federal civilian employees to private-sector workers was 1.36 in 1929, the first 
year these data were available. The relative advantage of federal salaries over 
those in the private sector has been maintained ever since, although there has 
been fluctuation in the size of the premium obtained by federal employees. 
Figure 5.1 outlines the relative wage advantage between  1949 and  1990 of 
federal employees over both those in the private sector and state and local gov- 
ernment employees.  During the  1950s, the ratio of  federal to private-sector 
wages remained fairly constant, but it grew in the  1960s and  1970s, a time 
when union representation in the federal sector was expanding. Over the period 
1949-90,  the  ratio  of  federal  to private-sector  pay  has  averaged  1.31. For 
comparison,  the  ratio  of  federal  to  state  and  local  government  pay  has 
averaged 1.35. 
The data indicate that federal employees have done well compared to both 
groups in the postwar period. The NIPA data, however, do not control for job 
skills, education, or other factors that may account for higher relative federal 
pay. A more widely accepted procedure for comparing earnings across differ- 
ent groups of  workers is to estimate a regression of the form 
w,  = xvpj  + Eij, 
where W is the wage rate for individual i in sectorj, usually measured in loga- 
rithmic terms, so that the estimated coefficients measure approximately  the 
percentage effect on wages due to changes in the right-hand-side variables. In 
the equation, Xis  a vector of measured characteristics of the individual worker, 
such as years of schooling, sex, race, location, and experience. The vector of 
regression coefficients, p,  reflects the return or effect on wages due to a change 
in the corresponding element of the X vector for a member of groupj. 
Although there are a number of variants, comparisons between sectors can 
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of a representative individual employed in some other sector, k. This procedure 
yields a prediction of  what that same individual would earn if  employed in 
sector j.  Subtracting this predicted value from the earnings estimate obtained 
using the representative worker's  own vector of  coefficients, p,,  provides a 
measure of the wage differential between sectors. Despite the potential prob- 
lems with the use of  relative federal wage ratios computed from NIPA  data, 
controlling for a host of socioeconomic characteristics does not alter the pic- 
ture of a relative federal wage advangage shown in figure 5.1. Without excep- 
tion, studies that have used Current Population Survey (CPS) data and standard 
human capital earnings regressions reveal that most federal workers enjoy rela- 
tively higher wages than either their private- or their public-sector counter- 
One of  the first comprehensive studies on relative federal sector pay  that 
attempted to control for variations in the attributes of  workers was that of 
Sharon Smith (1977). Her estimates were obtained using public use samples 
of  the census for the years 1960 and  1970 and CPS data files for  1973 and 
1975. Smith estimated the basic human capital earnings equations described 
above, with either individual hourly wage rates or annual earnings as the de- 
pendent variable. The controlling variables included measures of years of ex- 
perience, education, race, sex, marital status, location, and major occupation. 
Her results indicated not only that federal wages were above those for compa- 
rable workers in the private sector but also that there was considerable variation 
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in the size of the differential across groups.26  In particular, the differential was 
greater for women, certain racial minorities, and federal employees stationed 
in rural areas. Her estimates for 1960, for example, indicated that the relative 
wage advantage was 8 percent for males and  13 percent for females (Smith 
1977, 68).17 According to Smith, the regional wage differentials reflected the 
use of a national pay  scale for GS employees.  The federal wage differential 
was lower in the Northeast and higher in the South. This is just the opposite of 
the pattern for private-sector wages, which have tended to be low in the South 
and high in the Northeast (Smith  1977, 91). Consistent with  the NIPA data 
shown in figure 5.1, Smith (p. 63) also found that the wage differential between 
state and local workers  and private-sector  workers was, on average, close to 
zero in 1975.?* 
In addition to other studies, similar to Smith’s, that have used CPS data and 
human capital earnings regressions, researchers have compared quit rates and 
job queues in the public and private sector. Unless the federal wage advantage 
reflects compensation for some negative, nonpecuniary  condition associated 
with employment or location, quit rates should be lower and queues higher in 
the federal sector. This prediction is supported by the available research. Evi- 
dence from a variety of  studies strongly indicates that quit rates are substan- 
tially lower in the federal sector.29  Complementary evidence was presented by 
Alan Krueger (1988~1,  1988b), who looked at application rates for federal and 
private-sector jobs. While  Krueger cautioned that the comparisons may  not 
reflect similar occupations, the data that he presented suggest that federal job 
openings attract more applicants than do positions in the private sector.30  Thus, 
with the exception of the PATC surveys, which are influenced by federal unions 
and employee groups, the available evidence indicates that federal workers en- 
joy a relative wage advantage over workers elsewhere in the economy. 
The NIPA data in figure 5.1 indicate that the federal wage advantage de- 
clined in the late 1970s. Although this decline may be a mere aberration in the 
general pattern of federal wages since the early 1920s, the effect on different 
groups of federal workers is revealing. Recent work by Larry Katz and Alan 
Krueger (1991, 1992) using CPS data and standard wage regressions, summa- 
rized in table 5.3, indicates that the relative decline in the federal wage since 
the late 1970s has been borne mostly by more highly educated employees.”  In 
comparison, the pattern of wages in the private sector over the last decade has 
moved in the opposite direction. In the private sector, less-educated male work- 
ers have fared poorly, while more highly educated women have experienced 
significant increases in their real wages. A national federal pay structure that 
largely protects rank-and-file  workers  from the negative effects of  changing 
patterns of pay in the private sector is, of course, consistent with the objectives 
of federal unions. 
In recent years, increased attention has been focused on a so-called human 
resource crisis in the federal government that appears to be remedied only by 
increasing federal salaries (see, e.g.,  Hudson Institute  1988; Lane and Wolf 111  The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Year  Gini Coefficient 
1928  ,208 
1949  ,185 
1960  ,171 
Table 5.3  FederaUPrivate Percentage Wage Differentials, by Sex, Education, 
and Year 
Year  Gini Coefficient 
1969  ,203 
1979  .232 
1989  ,236 
Male  Female 
High School  College  High School  College 
~ 
1960  8  ...  13  .. 
1973175  8  13  32  49 
I979  2  7  22  16 
1983  8  12  26  27 
1988  5  1  25  21 
I991  II  1  30  16 
Source and nofes:  The reported differentials arc log points. The 1960 figures arc from Smith (1977, 
68) and reflect the use of federal weights (sample mean values) to compare workers with the same 
characteristics. The mean educational level for federal workers in  1960 was twelve years for both 
males and females. The mean years of experience was approximately twenty-four years for both 
sexes (Smith 1977, 162-63).  The source for all other years is Katz and Krueger (1992, table  I). 
Katz and Krueger report the expected wage for workers with the following characteristics: white, 
full-time employee, resident of an SMSA (standard metropolitan statistical area) with twenty-five 
years of experience. 
Table 5.4  Gini Coefficients for Pay Distribution in the Federal Government 
Sources and nofes: The procedures for computing the Gini coefficients arc described in Miller 
(1960). Data on federal pay distributions for 1928 are from Feldman (193  I, app. D, p. 265). The 
source for all other years is Office of Personnel Management (1989). 
1990; Levitan and Noden  1983; and Volcker  1988). There is little question 
that pay for top-level government executives is depressed and that higher-level 
positions are sometimes difficult to fill. But wage compression in the federal 
sector is hardly a new issue. Throughout much of the post-World  War I1 pe- 
riod, either special pay ceilings or salary caps have been in effect for top-level 
GS positions (see Hartman 1980). While these ceilings are adjusted from time 
to time, maintaining a lid on the salaries of top officials has contributed to a 
federal pay  structure that is far more egalitarian than that found for the U.S. 
labor force as a whole. 
Table 5.4 presents Lorenz-Gini  coefficients for the federal workforce for 
selected years starting in  1928. The Gini coefficient must lie between one and 
zero, with a value of zero implying no income inequality. In 1979, the Gini 
coefficient for the federal  sector was  .23. The private-sector coefficient for 
1979 was approximately  double that  value, .45.32  Although the Gini coeffi- 112  Chapter5 
cients for the federal sector do not exhibit much variation between  1928 and 
1989, there is some hint of  an actual decrease in equality over time. Recent 
estimates for the entire U.S.  labor market also indicate a decline in equality in 
the  1980s (see Levy and Mumane 1992). Nevertheless,  the low Gini coeffi- 
cients for the federal sector appear to be due mainly to an increase in the pro- 
portion of federal workers in higher GS level professional and managerial posi- 
tions rather than  to a managed  response  to changes  in private-sector  pay.33 
When compared to figures for the U.S. labor force as a whole, those presented 
in table 5.4 are not only consistent with the argument that the federal pay struc- 
ture exhibits considerable compression but also indicate that this condition is 
not a new one. Federal employee unions have long sought to implement egali- 
tarian pay systems. 
In addition to relatively higher wages, federal workers also have health and 
retirement benefits that are considered superior to those provided in the private 
sector.34  Figure 5.2 presents NIPA data on the ratio of total compensation of 
federal employees to that of private-sector  and state and local employees. In- 
cluding nonwage compensation increases slightly the federal relative advan- 
tage computed over the entire period 1949-90  shown in figure 5.1. It also ne- 
gates much of the decline in the federal/private wage ratio exhibited since the 
late  1970s. Hence, taking the NIPA data with  the numerous human  capital 
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ture that emerges is one of a federal  labor force that is relatively  well  off. 
Contributing to that outcome is the influence that federal unions have had over 
the design and implementation of civil service rules governing promotions. 
5.3.2  Promotion and the Returns to Tenure 
The General Schedule provides GS grades that are linked to specific posi- 
tions through the position classification process and uniform procedures  for 
promotions. Subject to the approval of the Office of Personnel Management, 
supervisors in each agency define positions with regard to responsibilities and 
qualification requirements, and they coordinate with agency classifiers to se- 
lect the appropriate occupation code and range of GS levels for positions. This 
process  defines  the  immediate job ladder  for  each  employee.  Importantly, 
within grades GS-1-GS-15  there have historically been ten steps with pay in- 
creases of 3 percent each, thus providing a 30 percent salary range within each 
grade. A central responsibility for supervisors is the evaluation of subordinate 
performance. Typically, a five-point scale has been used, whereby  1 is unsatis- 
factory, 2 is minimally satisfactory, 3 is fully satisfactory, 4 exceeds fully satis- 
factory, and 5 is outstanding.3s According to civil service rules, these ratings 
are to be used in managing and motivating subordinates for within-grade step 
salary increases and for promotion to higher GS grades. In practice, however, 
within-grade step salary increases have been largely automatic. 
Under civil service rules there are significant costs and few benefits to super- 
visors who issue poor evaluations. The current rules require extensive docu- 
mentation of poor performance, and the burden of proof lies with the supervi- 
sor. The supervisor must notify the subordinate ninety days in advance of his 
plan to assign a low rating to allow time for the subordinate to improve his 
performance  and to develop a program of remedial training. Adverse ratings 
are subject to review by senior officials, and the employee can appeal through 
personnel channels within the agency and then to the Merit System Protection 
Board. Since the signing of Executive Order 10988, an employee within a unit 
represented by one of the federal unions may also use the union’s negotiated 
grievance procedures. The unions have been aggressive in promoting the use 
of their grievance procedures and in their defense of employees (Nesbitt 1976, 
23547).  Moreover, the unions and various employee groups have repeatedly 
lobbied Congress to reduce the discretionary authority of supervisors with re- 
gard to promotions  and have fought attempts to use in-step promotions  for 
performance incentives. 
For example, with the Federal Salary Reform Act and the Postal Employees 
Salary Adjustment  Act  of  1962 (76 Stat. 8501, the  Congress added perfor- 
mance criteria for awarding within-grade step increases.36 Under the law, the 
step increases would be granted after time requirements  were met and after 
the employee’s supervisor verified that the work was of an acceptable level of 
competence. This clause was designed to give supervisors discretion in award- 
ing salary increases in an effort to improve the productivity of  GS workers. 114  Chapters 
The provision for supervisory discretion, however, brought opposition from 
federal unions and related groups, During hearings before the House and Sen- 
ate Post Office and Civil Service Committees, these groups sought to have the 
provision calling for an acceptable level of competence repealed. Among those 
testifying before the committees, only the Civil Service Commission and the 
Bureau of the Budget called for retention of a performance criteria. The direc- 
tor of the Civil Service Commission argued that under the 1962 law the step 
salary increase “was largely a matter for determination by those who have su- 
pervisory responsibility, that the increase was not an automatic right, and that 
it could and would be withheld if the performance was not up to standard.” In 
opposition, the president of the AFGE emphasized to the committee members 
the political significance of federal white-collar employees: “There are 1.7 mil- 
lion persons looking to you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, to 
protect their interests.” He went on, “We in the AFGE believe this provision 
should be repealed outright” (US.  Senate 1965, 26, 129, 132). The members 
of the House and Senate committees appeared responsive to union demands. 
Although the performance criterion was not repealed, additional notification 
requirements were added. 
There have been repeated efforts to tie in-step increases to performance, 
and, each time, federal unions have opposed the change. In  1975, the Presi- 
dent’s Panel on Federal Compensation noted that “most private employers and 
Federal  agency managers who responded  to the Federal  Register notice on 
this issue favored changing the emphasis on within-grade advancement from 
longevity to merit. Federal employee unions expressed skepticism about man- 
agement’s ability to make necessary judgments about individual performance 
in a fair and objective manner, and favored retention of  the present system” 
(U.S. Senate 1976,467). The unwillingness on the part of the Congress clearly 
to mandate the use of merit performance ratings has not been lost on federal 
supervisors. 
The documentation requirements and appeals processes raise the costs to 
supervisors who rate the performance of subordinates critically. Moreover, the 
reward system for supervisors does not appear to offer incentives that are suf- 
ficiently strong to overcome these costs. Although the Civil Service Reform 
Act of  1978 called for the use of merit-pay incentives for supervisors, the re- 
wards have not been very high. In 1985, for example, the average award was 
around 2 percent, with a few individuals receiving as much as 10 percent.37 
While advancement to higher managerial positions or to the Senior Executive 
Service depends on the supervisor’s performance, wage compression reduces 
the incentive to compete for those positions, especially via the costly route of 
negative subordinate evaluations. The costs and incentives facing supervisors 
appear to have contributed to the practice of granting high performance ratings 
within the federal civil service. 
As the U.S. Classification Task Force noted, “Withholding an increase is 
difficult and requires extraordinary effort on the part of the supervisor to docu- 115  The Maturation of  Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
ment. The path of least resistance is to grant the increase, and this is the path 
almost every supervisor chooses to follow” (1981, 87). The same point was 
made during hearings on the Civil Service Reform Act of  1978: “The prospect 
of  successfully dealing with the appeals process, to ensure that the person is 
not returned  to the rolls, causes managers  to go through  a long process  of 
preparation that can take months or longer. Often the manager’s conclusion is 
that the task  is too formidable and he abandons the effort. At the least, the 
process is excessively delayed and far more time of the managers must be de- 
voted to the process than  is justified”  (United  States Code  1978, 2762).  In 
fiscal year 1986, over 98 percent of all GS- 1-GS-12  employees received a fully 
satisfactory (3) rating or better. Only 1 percent were rated unsatisfactory  (I)? 
This pattern  of  ratings appears to reflect a long-standing practice.  The U.S. 
Classification Task Force (1  98  1, 87) reported that typically less than  1 percent 
of those eligible are denied step salary increases. The effect of this policy is 
that subordinates who receive a fully satisfactory or higher rating are assured 
of receiving within-grade step salary increases. 
Accordingly,  step salary  increases  are  virtually  assured  as  soon  as time 
requirements  are  fulfilled.3y Similarly, promotion  within  the job ladder  re- 
quires minimum  time within  a grade. There are over 400 occupation codes 
within the General Schedule, and each has a range of  GS levels that can al- 
low for job ladder promotions. Promotion criteria are outlined in chapter 335 
of  the  Federal  Personnel  Manual  (US. Office  of  Personnel  Management 
1984), and time in grade is an important criterion. Hence, for the typical fed- 
eral employee, service time seems to be the primary factor for advancement. 
The earnings profiles for federal workers provide strong support for this argu- 
ment. 
To examine earnings profiles of federal employees, we utilized the following 
human capital earnings regression: 
Here, In  W,  is the log of the annual salary for individual  i,  E is total years of 
potential work experience (age minus years of schooling minus 6), T is tenure 
(time) with the current employer, ET is an interaction term, and Xi  is a vector of 
socioeconomic variables. Squared terms are included to account for the usual 
concavity  of earnings profiles.  This particular  specification was chosen be- 
cause it allows for the growth in earnings to be decomposed  into two parts, 
experience and tenure. 
Estimates of the parameters for the above equation for federal workers were 
obtained using a random sample of GS employees provided by the Office of 
Personnel Management. The estimation results are presented in detail in ap- 
pendix C.40  The results show that both the total experience and the tenure vari- 
ables are statistically significant at better  than the  1 percent  level, and they 
exhibit the usual concave earnings profile.‘“  Additionally, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, although small, is negative. This would seem to suggest that 116  Chapter5 
experience and tenure are not complements in the federal sector. Nevertheless, 
the earnings profile shows wages steadily increasing with job tenure. 
Consider, for example,  an individual  with  twenty  years of tenure and no 
previous  experience.  Here,  E = T = 20.  Given  the  estimated  coefficients, 
wages for this worker would increase 63 percent over the twenty-year period.4Z 
But, decomposing the total growth in earnings by subtracting the contribution 
of experience, the growth in earnings attributable solely to job tenure is 55 
percent. Thus, tenure matters a great deal in the federal sector, and it appears 
to matter more than it does in the private sector. 
While all the studies mentioned in the previous  section that use CPS data 
to compare private and federal wages include a variable to account for total 
experience, none include a variable to account for  There are, however, 
other wage-regression studies of the private sector where the researchers have 
included job tenure as an explanatory variable. Masanori Hashimoto and John 
Raisian (1983, for example, provide estimates using the same specification as 
described above for private-sector employees in large firms, the size group that 
federal unions argue is the group that should be used for salary comparison 
purposes. As are the results reported in appendix C for federal workers, the 
estimates provided by Hashimoto and Raisian are statistically significant and 
exhibit  a concave  earnings pr~file.~"  Given their estimated  coefficients, the 
earnings profile that emerges shows wages rising  103 percent over a twenty- 
year period. This is much higher than the increase for a federal worker over 
the same period of time and is consistent with our argument that there is wage 
compression in the federal sector. If wages are compressed in the federal sector 
relative to those in the private sector, we should expect the earnings profile for 
federal workers  to be flatter. But there is more to the story. When the total 
growth in earnings is decomposed into its two parts, the percentage growth in 
earnings due to tenure in the private sector is only 36 percent. In addition, in 
Hashimoto and Raisian's regressions, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between experience and tenure, ET is positive, suggesting that experience mat- 
ters more in the private sector. 
In addition to the study by Hashimoto and Raisian, who consider only male 
workers, there are a number of other studies that use CPS data and include job 
tenure in the regressions. Elaine Sorensen (1989) offers separate estimates for 
both  males and females in nonmanufacturing jobs. Her results indicate that 
twenty years of job tenure will increase earnings by 43 percent for males and 
48 percent for females.45  Again, these returns are less than the 55 percent re- 
turn found for federal  These results suggest that tenure is more im- 
portant for explaining earnings growth in the federal than in the private sector. 
Moreover, the returns to tenure in the private  sector are often interpreted as 
reflecting investments  in specific human capital.'"  In contrast, the arguments 
presented in this section suggest that the high returns to tenure in the federal 
government have much more to do with union influence on civil service rules 
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5.3.3  Removal Protection 
Early in the development of the civil service system, both the president and 
the Congress found it necessary to grant federal workers protection from re- 
movals that were politically motivated. Contemporary protections against re- 
movals, however, appear to go well beyond what is required by federal politi- 
cians to reduce costly competition over the control of merit-system employees. 
Currently, individuals enter the federal labor force for a probationary period of 
one to two years. During that time, supervisors have much greater discretion 
in dismissing a subordinate for poor performance than they do once tenure has 
been granted. The extensive protection offered by the civil service system to 
tenured white-collar employees is demonstrated by the application of federal 
reduction-in-force (RIF) procedures. RIFs are the most drastic form of position 
reduction in the federal government. They can result in involuntary separations 
and the downgrading of employees to lower-ranked positions. Nevertheless, 
the procedural requirements are so designed to protect seniority that the per- 
manent effect of RIFs on all but nontenured employees is limited. 
RIF regulations, as defined in chapter 35  1 of the Federal Personnel Manual 
(U.S. Office of Personnel Management  1984), call for employees in the tar- 
geted positions to compete for remaining jobs. Besides tenure status, retention 
is based on seniority, veteran’s status, and performance ratings, with seniority 
the most important factor. The emphasis on seniority once again reflects the 
ability of unions to prevail over traditional  merit concepts, which emphasize 
performance ratings (Nesbitt 1976, 23  1). Under these criteria, temporary em- 
ployees are the most vulnerable. Once a RIF extends to permanent employees, 
they can be transferred to positions in the agency not subject to RIFs, or they 
can bump lower-ranked employees. Any employee who is downgraded, how- 
ever, retains his GS rank and salary for up to two years. Beyond that, salaries 
are adjusted until the downgraded employee’s salary is commensurate with his 
or her new position. However, the adjustment period can be long since RIF 
procedures allow the individual to receive half of all authorized government 
salary increases until salaries are equalized. 
In recent years, there has been much attention focused on the RIFs author- 
ized by the Reagan administration (see, e.g., Levitan and Noden  1983). Be- 
tween  1981 and 1983, over forty-two agencies were involved in reductions in 
force. Despite this, the numbers of workers who were affected involuntarily 
was small, demonstrating the limited effect that RIFs can have on permanent 
employees. Ninety percent of the workforce reduction was through voluntary 
attrition and early retirement that was costly to the go~ernrnent.~~  In 1981, only 
2,629 personnel lost their jobs through RIFs, a figure that represents only 0.4 
percent of  total  1981 separations and only 0.09 percent of the average total 
civilian workforce for the year.49  Further, a U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1985, 35-37)  study of RIFs showed that, of the employees who were down- 
graded, many were quickly promoted. Of the 2,055 employees affected by the 118  Chapter5 
RIFs, 744 were downgraded to lower GS level positions. In less than two years, 
however, nearly half were promoted to their pre-RIF positions. 
5.3.4  A National Pay Plan 
Since federal unions lack the right to bargain directly over wages, they must 
influence salaries in more indirect ways. One objective has been the adoption 
of a national pay plan for white-collar workers, an arrangement long opposed 
by federal managers and the President’s Panel on Federal Compensation (US. 
Senate 1976, 466). Although national pay policies make civil service pay in- 
flexible with respect to local conditions, these same inflexibilities and the prob- 
lems they cause have been used by  federal unions to justify across-the-board 
wage increases. 
Recall that researchers, such as Smith (1977) and Katz and Krueger (1992), 
have found that the federal wage advantage varies across regions  and is in- 
versely related to local private-sector wages. They attribute this result to the 
existence of a national pay plan. Although GS salaries are not completely rigid, 
the wage regression  results presented  in appendix  C indicate  little regional 
variation in pay.5o  Federal GS salaries are somewhat lower in the Mountain and 
Southern states, reflecting private-sector pay patterns, but the difference is only 
around 2 percent. The coefficient on the Washington, D.C., dummy variable, 
however, reflects a rather larger differential, around 11 percent. Since Washing- 
ton, D.C., is the “home office” and the final stage in the promotion process, 
this coefficient, in part, reflects competitive promotions for top management 
 position^.^' No doubt, there are localities, such as New York City and Washing- 
ton, D.C., where the federal wage advantage for many occupations is smaller 
or may  not  exist.  Hence, if  pay  comparability  were  the  objective,  salaries 
should be lowered in most localities and, perhaps, increased in a few. Histori- 
cally, however, federal unions have opposed moving away from the national 
pay plan concept because wage compression and difficulties in hiring for cer- 
tain special occupations can serve union objectives. 
Having federal managers point out difficulties in hiring and retaining per- 
sonnel in critical areas has induced prominent individuals, such as Paul Vol- 
cker (1988), to proclaim a “crisis” in public service. Wage compression and 
the inability to keep senior technicians and administrators have been used in 
congressional hearings as reasons to justify the enactment of new salary legis- 
lati~n.~*  For example, during hearings on the 1962 Federal Salary Reform Act, 
a representative of the Civil Service Commission emphasized salary compres- 
sion as evidence of the need to reform and raise federal salaries. He stated that, 
owing to salary increases  that focused on lower-level positions, the ratio of 
salaries between the lowest and the highest grades dropped from 8.8 in 1939 
to 5.8 in  1962. The associated relative fall in senior-position  salaries led to 
the loss of key upper-level personnel, a condition supported by representative 
testimonials given by individuals who allegedly left the federal government for 
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called for across-the-board  pay increases to raise  wages for everyone (U.S. 
Senate 1962,64-89). Congress responded to the calls for salary increases with 
an across-the-board  raise, coupled with special advances for lower-level GS 
employees. 
Wage compression has a long history in the federal government, but being 
able to illustrate problems in hiring has its benefits for federal unions. In con- 
trast to blue-collar positions in the federal government, where occupations are 
few and relatively well defined, the General Schedule contains over 400 differ- 
ent occupation codes, some of which have no close counterpart in the private 
sector. The unions have argued that an adequate response to the problems of 
nonalignment between federal and market-determined  wages for specific se- 
nior positions would require special adjustments within the system of position 
classification, opening the door to favoritism. The simple alternative that they 
have supported is to increase salaries across the board. In fact, between  1945 
and the present, pay increases for GS workers have typically been across-the- 
board percentage   increase^.^^ This practice elevates all salaries, but the prob- 
lem of wage compression remains. Wage compression seems to be a valuable 
tool for obtaining new wage increases. 
Recent efforts to add flexibility to the federal pay structure again illustrate 
the influence of  federal unions  and professional  organizations.  The Federal 
Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 allows for increased pay flexibility 
by permitting region-specific wage differentials. However, federal wages can 
be adjusted only upward, not downward, assuring that these reforms are not 
likely to reduce the relative federal wage advantage for the typical worker. 
5.4  Summary 
At the end of chapter 3, we observed that one of the consequences of the 
creation of the classified (merit) service was that it encouraged federal employ- 
ees to organize as an interest group with an important stake in the development 
of the civil service system. In chapter 4, we detailed the formation  of early 
federal employee  unions and their  success  in  obtaining  workplace  benefits 
ahead of their private-sector counterparts as well as favorable salary increases. 
In this chapter, we have seen the process continue. Federal employee unions 
and related groups have become an integral part of the salary determination 
process, consulting on the design of comparability surveys and on the pay rec- 
ommendations made to the president. Through their efforts they have achieved 
civil service rules that provide for unusual protections against involuntary re- 
movals, high returns to seniority (rather than merit), an egalitarian pay struc- 
ture, and a salary-determination  process  that  provides comparatively  higher 
salaries than those for their counterparts in the private or other public sectors. 
These conditions are not new but have been in place for some time. Indeed, 
the federal wage advantage and tenure guarantees have existed since the 1920s. 
Our emphasis on the role of federal unions and professional groups in influ- 120  Chapter5 
encing the development of the civil service system provides insight into the 
debate over the effect of public policy on the growth of unions. As outlined by 
John Burton and Terry Thomason (1988, 17-27)  and Richard Freeman (1986, 
45-48),  there is a question of which came first, union strength or public policy 
promoting  unions,  such  as Executive  Order  10988? Freeman  stresses the 
growth in public-sector  unionism following 1962 as evidence of  the impor- 
tance of  favorable public policies. For the federal government, however, the 
record seems clear that federal unions (especially postal unions) were active 
prior to the enactment of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of  1912, that federal unions 
were extremely successful in obtaining favorable benefits and salary legislation 
prior to World War I and during the 1920s, and that Executive Order 10988 was 
itself a reflection of the political strength of federal employee unions. Union 
membership grew after 1962, and federal unions obtained critical roles in the 
salary  comparability  process.  Nevertheless,  this  was  a  continuation  of  the 
longer-term  process  of  institution  development,  where  federal  employee 
unions and groups have played a key and, perhaps, dominant role. 
We argue that comparatively high salaries and returns to tenure for federal 
workers reflect the effectiveness of federal unions and professional groups as 
lobbyists. These attributes of the civil service system, however, may not have 
been due solely to the efforts of federal employees. It has, for example, been 
argued that the design of the federal wage structure instead reflects an attempt 
on the part of legislators to reduce shirking by providing federal workers with 
appropriate  incentive^.^^ Certainly, wage-incentive policies are prevalent in the 
private sector, and it is possible that they could be of even more value in the 
federal government. Although the federal pay structure does contain some in- 
centives, closer inspection reveals major elements that are inconsistent  with 
usual notions of incentive wages. 
Consider, for example, Edward Lazear’s (1981) point that, when it is costly 
to monitor the performance of workers, the firm may benefit by allowing wages 
to grow with tenure, even if productivity does not. In this case, earnings pro- 
files increase with time because delaying payment until late in a worker’s career 
reduces incentives to shirk. The worker is paid less than his or her marginal 
product initially and more later on, depending on a specified level of perfor- 
mance. If shirking is detected and results in dismissal, the worker will suffer a 
greater decline in  the present value of future earnings than if  payment had 
been tied to the value of marginal product in each time period. The steeper the 
earnings profile, the larger the penalty associated with shirking. Presumably, 
those firms faced with relatively higher costs of monitoring or where the costs 
of shirking are especially high will elect to have a steeper earnings profile. 
The incentive to monitor workers can, of course, differ between the federal 
and the private sectors. As we have stressed, the federal government lacks a 
well-defined principal in charge of classified personnel. While the president is 
the most likely to be held accountable for the actions of federal employees, no 
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claimant in the firm. As with other types of externalities problems, those af- 
fected have an incentive to develop contractual arrangements to help solve the 
problem. Rather than relying on their colleagues to monitor worker’s perfor- 
mance, it is conceivable that federal politicians would be inclined to use pay- 
ment schemes such as a steeper earnings profile to reduce shirking and to im- 
prove productivity. 
Nevertheless,  although federal politicians may desire these wage-incentive 
policies, the civil service system lacks the required structure. Except in cases 
of malfeasance, it is very costly to dismiss a federal employee, thus negating 
the  use  of  a  steep earnings  profile  as a  device  to reduce  shirking. More- 
over, except for the very top positions, promotions are routine through  most 
job ladders. Even for top-level  positions,  it is not  apparent how the federal 
wage structure alone would induce much in the way  of greater effort. There 
is considerable wage compression, making it difficult to envision the federal 
pay structure as a good example of a “rank-order tournament” (see Lazear and 
Rosen 1981). 
There remains, however, the problem of malfeasance and the use of higher 
salaries to prevent it. It may be that the typical clerical worker in the federal 
government is capable of causing more harm through maleficent behavior than 
is a private-sector worker. Even if that were true, it would seem that the rela- 
tively high retirement benefits that federal workers can expect, if they do not 
violate the law, would provide an adequate incentive device without also hav- 
ing to offer relatively higher salaries. Moreover, the dominant weight placed 
on service time in the determination of pay for all rank-and-file  employees, 
regardless of whether their position presents a significant danger from malefi- 
cent behavior, works against an  “efficiency-wage’’ explanation for the high 
level of federal salaries. 
Perhaps, as Lazear has later suggested, pay compression can be efficient. If 
harmony  is important, then equality of pay can be a means for achieving it. 
But Lazear’s (1989) argument also implies that, if wage compression is a reac- 
tion to having a hawkish group of workers, the average wage in those firms 
will be lower. The wage regression evidence presented in this chapter, however 
indicates that the average federal wage is above that in the private or other 
public sectors. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the observed structure of civil service rules 
and the associated salary and benefits received by federal employees are not 
principally the result of efforts by politicians to improve efficiency in the deliv- 
ery of government services. Although efficiency concerns were an early moti- 
vating device for the president and the Congress to begin the process of civil 
service reform, the dominant factor since perhaps the turn of the century is the 
active participation of federal unions and professional groups in the design of 
the institution in their behalf. In the next chapter, we address the nagging ques- 
tion of why federal workers have been so successful, especially compared to 
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Notes 
1. For a discussion of federal unions and their membership, see Stem (1988). For 
the claim that at least half the members of the AFGE were wage board and low General 
Schedule employees, see Donoian (1967, 139). 
2. As we describe later in the chapter, federal unions have taken a very active role 
in lobbying for salary legislation and in obtaining a position to influence the annual 
Bureau of Labor Statistics wage survey and the recommendations for salary increases 
made by the president’s pay agent. Although professional associations are not passive, 
they are much less in evidence at congressional hearings, becoming more active period- 
ically, lobbying for upper-end salary increases only after salary compression has been 
a factor for some time. For example, compare the list of groups providing testimony in 
U.S. House of Representatives (1970) for the Federal Salary Comparability Act of 1970 
(84 Stat.  1946) and those in U.S. Senate (1962) for the  1962 Federal Salary Reform 
Act (76 Stat. 841, 1465). In the latter case, professional groups were especially con- 
cerned about the cumulative effects of wage compression and turned out in compara- 
tively large numbers. 
3. For a summary, see Burton and Thomason (1988, 17-27). 
4. Annual data on employment levels and salaries of GS employees are available 
from U.S. Office of  Personnel Management (1989). 
5. This was changed under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of  1990 (104 Stat. 
1427). 
6. Authorization for this change came from the Postal Reorganization Act, 12 Au- 
gust  1970 (84 Stat. 719). For a historical analysis of the post office’s change from a 
federal department to a government enterprise, see Adie (1977). 
7. For a description of the circumstances leading to the adoption of position classi- 
fication, see Feldman (1931, 17-22). 
8. The report of the Hoover Commission in 1949 was instrumental in promoting the 
notion that position classification was essential for managing the federal bureaucracy. 
9. Kappel Commission (1968, 1:121,4:7,65). Levitan and Noden (1983, 104) note 
that the AFGE was at one time especially determined to maintain a national pay plan 
for white-collar workers. Their position has softened in recent years as granting geo- 
graphic wage differentials appears to be an effective way to increase general wages. 
10. For discussions of the provisions of Executive Order 10988, see Howlett (1984) 
and Case (1986). 
11. Federal law since the Lloyd-LaFollette Act has ruled out strikes. Section 305 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 reads, “Any individual employed by  the United States or 
any such agency who strikes shall be discharged immediately” (61 Stat. 136). While 
the  federal  government  has  at  times  wavered  in  its  application  of  this  provision, 
allowing certain types of work stoppages to occur, the firing of striking air traffic con- 
trollers by President Reagan illustrates the potential force of this law.  For discussion, 
see Nesbitt (1976,361-98)  and Levitan and Noden (1983, 100-103). 
12. For discussion of union membership and the distinctions among union member- 
ship, representation, and bargaining units, see Burton and Thomason (1988, 2-4,  30- 
31) and Levitan and Noden (1983,4-9,  14-20). 
13. For a discussion of how these boards functioned and the governance of federal 
wages in general, see Nesbitt (1976,399-434). 
14. Levitan and Noden (1983, 71) note that the new system for determining FWS 
wages has probably biased federal wages upward. 
15. Levitan and Noden report that dues-paying membership in the AFGE, the largest 
of the federal unions, “is composed of clerical workers (45 percent), with blue collar 
workers accounting for 40 percent and professional for 15 percent” (1983, 20). 123  The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
16. Even the Kappel Commission (1968,  1:25) noted that postal employee unions 
had been able to obtain salary levels higher than those in the general economy. 
17. With the existence of geographic wage differences in the private sector, a federal 
wage set nationally is a contradiction in terms. 
18. Under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of  1970, the size of the pay council 
was limited to five representatives. In  1975, e.g., the members of the Federal Employees 
Pay Council were the president of the National Treasury Employees Union, both the 
president and executive vice president of the AFGE, the president of the NFFE, and an 
economist from the Department of Research of the AFL-CIO (U.S. Senate 1976,225). 
The Federal Pay Comparability Act of  1990 established a Federal Salary Council of 
nine members, six of  whom are to be representatives of  employee organizations that 
represent a substantial number of GS employees. 
19. In  1978, e.g., all five members of the pay council resigned their positions. While 
that action attracted considerable attention, these former members continued to use the 
pay agent’s annual report as a forum for expressing their displeasure at legislated pay 
increases. See President’s Pay Agent (1980). See also the statement by  Paul Volcker 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1989, 8). 
20. The ECI was to consider private-sector wages and other locality-based compara- 
bility adjustments (U.S. House of Representatives 1990, 170-76). 
21. U.S. Department of Labor (1981) provides a summary of the recommendations 
of the president’s pay agent and actual increases for the 1970s. To achieve comparability 
in  1971, the pay  agent recommended an increase of 6.5 percent. The actual increase 
was  5.5  percent.  Throughout  the  1970s, actual increases  were below those  recom- 
mended, and, by  1980, the pay agent was recommending an increase of  13.5 percent. 
The actual increase was 4.8 percent that year. 
22. See, e.g., Smith (1977). A somewhat different point of view, one that attempts 
to rationalize the PATC  surveys, is offered by  Levitan and Noden (1983). See also 
Hartman (1983). 
23. The existence of wage differentials based on firm size is well known in the litera- 
ture on labor,economics. Controlling for various employee characteristics, Katz and 
Krueger (1991) report differentials  that range  from  approximately  8 to 25 percent 
higher in large firms. 
24. See Freeman (1980). In 1975, federal unions opposed differential pay increases 
because, they claimed, such pay schemes are “inequitable” (U.S. Senate 1976, p. 237). 
25. For a comprehensive survey of the studies completed prior to the mid-l980s, see 
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986). 
26. Smith (1977) uses coefficients obtained via OLS estimation to calculate the wage 
differentials. More recent studies by Venti (1987) and Gyourko and Tracy (1988) show 
that correcting for the potential problem of selection bias does not alter the basic con- 
clusion that there is a positive federal wage advantage. 
27. The relative wage advantage figures were derived using federal weights to com- 
pare workers with the same characteristics. While women employed by the federal gov- 
ernment have a relative wage advantage over their private-sector counterparts, within 
the federal government they earn less than males with similar education and experience 
(see app. C). The coefficient on Female is -.096,  suggesting earnings that are 10 per- 
cent lower than those for male counterparts. 
28. While most of the wage-regression studies referred to in the text seldom distin- 
guish between union and nonunion workers, the available evidence indicates that fed- 
eral workers continue to earn a wage premium even when the comparison made is to 
unionized private-sector workers. For example, Wachter and Perloff (1992, 29) report 
a wage premium for postal workers compared to private-sector workers of 21.3 percent. 
Comparing postal workers with private-sector unionized workers lowers the wage pre- 124  Chapters 
mium to 10.8 percent. Gyourko and Tracy (1988) find a wage differential of 14 percent 
in favor of unionized workers in the private sector, but they also find that federal work- 
ers enjoy a wage premium of  18 percent compared to all private-sector workers. 
29. See Adie (1977), Long (1982), and Borjas (1982). Ippolito (1987) argues that 
low quit rates in the federal sector are due to the relatively higher pensions that federal 
workers can expect to receive if  they remain on the job until retirement age. Federal 
workers do have excellent retirement benefits, and quit rates are undoubtedly affected 
by the fact that these benefits are lost if the worker quits before the specified retirement 
age. But Ippolito’s argument that, “if the government wants the quit rate to be as high 
as the private sector, it can do this by  raising the cash wage and lowering the pension 
amount” (p. 298) ignores the evidence provided by Smith (1977) and others using CPS 
data that federal wages exceed those in the private sector. 
30. Given that there are queues for certain federal jobs, competition for these posi- 
tions involves a cost that could lower the implied wage advantage (Bronars and Lott 
1989). 
3 1. Like Katz and Krueger, Freeman (1  987) and Moulton (1990) use CPS data, but 
with different controlling variables. They also report finding a decline in the federal 
wage advantage. 
32. The Gini coefficient for the entire U.S. labor force is based on various estimates 
reported by Levy and Murnane (1992, table 2, pt. 1). The figure refers to annual wages 
and salaries for all persons, sixteen years and older, with positive wage and salary in- 
comes. 
33. When the GS system was established in  1949, the average GS grade was 5.25. 
By  1989, the average had risen to 8.69 (US.  Office of Personnel Management 1989). 
34. For a comparison of retirement benefits, see Ippolito (1987). Using a 1980 survey 
conducted by the Office of Personnel Management, Levitan and Noden (1983,83) sug- 
gest that expenditures on health benefits per employee are lower in the federal than in 
the private sector. Even if  correct, this ignores the fact that large employers tend to 
receive substantial discounts on their health programs. Moreover, federal workers are 
in a ,better position to tailor their choice of health plans to their own specific circum- 
stances. 
35. See U.S. Merit System Protection Board (1987). The procedures that supervisors 
are to follow in evaluating subordinates are described in U.S. Office of Personnel Man- 
agement (1984, chap. 430). 
36. These two laws dealing with federal salary issues were part of a package of fed- 
eral labor legislation. 
37. The figures on the distribution of merit pay were supplied by the Office of Person- 
nel Management. 
38. Data on rating distributions for white-collar workers were provided by the Sys- 
tems and Analysis Branch of the Office of Personnel Management. 
39. There are also automatic step increases for FWS workers (see Levitan and Noden 
1983,73). 
40. A more detailed analysis of these regression results is contained in Johnson and 
Libecap (1989a). 
41. Given our large data set (16,616), the significance of a coefficient is not the main 
criterion. What matters is the size of the coefficients and the resulting earnings profile. 
42. An estimate of the total percentage growth in earnings can be derived by setting 
E and T to predetermined values and substituting into 100[exp(P,E + P2E2  + P3T + 
43. Venti (1987), e.g., used 1982 CPS data to compare federal and private-sector pay. 
He included years of potential experience and experience squared in his regressions, 
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but no measure of tenure. His results reveal little difference in the earnings profiles of 
private-sector and federal workers. 
44. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985,730) report the following results (the total number 
of observations was 3,750): 
Variable  Coefficient  r-statistic 
E  ,0372  16.4 
E?  -  ,0007  -  13.0 
T  ,0121  4.3 
P  -  .0003  -3.6 
ET  ,0003  2.3 
45. For the estimated coefficients on the tenure variables, see Sorensen (1989, 68, 
app. D). Her finding that the returns to tenure in the private sector are somewhat higher 
for females than for males is consistent with other studies (see, e.g., Goldin 1990; and 
Hersch and Reagan 1993). 
46. Since our estimation of the returns to tenure includes both males and females, it 
could be biased upward compared to an overall measure for the private sector if  there 
were a greater proportion of females in the federal workforce. While it is correct that 
the proportion of females in state and local employment, including education, is higher 
than it is in the private sector, the proportion of females in the GS workforce in 1985, 
and in our sample data set, was .46. That figure is equivalent to the proportion of fe- 
males employed in the private-sector workforce (see U.S. Department of Commerce 
199  1). Moreover, there is evidence that promotion probabilities in the federal govem- 
ment are very similar for men and women (Lewis 1986). 
47. Because of the potential for bias when using cross-sectional data and OLS esti- 
mation procedures, there has been considerable debate over whether previous empirical 
results actually reflected a return to job tenure. Using longitudinal data on the private 
sector, Topel (!991)  provides compelling evidence that job tenure does matter, lending 
support to the view that there are investments in specific human capital. 
48. The effect of these RIFs is discussed in U.S. General Accounting Office (1985). 
49. U.S.  General Accounting Office (1985,2) lists total number of employees invol- 
untarily separated through RIFs. The 1981 figure was divided by the total federal sepa- 
rations and the average civilian workforce for that year, as provided in U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Work Force Statistics, Monthly Release (De- 
cember 1981, table 16). 
50. Supervisors have exhibited a willingness to engage in discretionary actions to 
hire and retain individuals with desired skills (Johnson and Libecap, 1989b). 
5 1. Johnson and Libecap (1989b) provide additional results suggesting that federal 
supervisors have also increased the salaries of clerical workers in the Washington, D.C., 
area. In part, this is due to difficulties experienced in hiring qualified workers in that 
area. 
52. For a discussion of the problems in hiring scientists and engineers, see Campbell 
and Dix (1990). 
53. For a chronology of federal pay legislation, see U.S. Office of Personnel Manage- 
ment (1989, table 19). 
54. The notion that the federal employment contract mainly reflects an attempt by 
the Congress to reduce agency problems through performance incentives is advanced 
by Horn (1  988). 